



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on June 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine on June 7 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. Putin stated following his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) that Russia does not need to conduct another call-up of reservists similar to Russia's September 2022 partial mobilization because Russia is not trying to rapidly achieve its military objectives in Ukraine.[1] Putin acknowledged that the current Russian military contingent committed to the war in Ukraine (reportedly the Russian military's entire combat-capable ground force as of January 2024) would be insufficient for a rapid victory but suggested that Russian forces are instead pursuing a more gradual approach.[2] Putin stated that Russian forces aim to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of those territories that should be under Russian control" and therefore Russia does not need to conduct another mobilization wave.[3] Putin asserted that Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are sufficient for this approach and that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024 (a figure consistent with reports that the Russian military recruits between 20,000-30,000 recruits per month).[4]

Putin's assessment that gradual Russian gains will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine is predicated on the assumption that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize and that the Russian military will be able to sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains regardless of heavy losses. Western intelligence has previously assessed that Putin assesses that US and Western support to Ukraine is "finite" and that Russian forces have

blunted Ukrainian efforts to retake significant territory.[5] Putin's assessment has been reinforced by the recent months of delayed Western security assistance and corresponding Ukrainian materiel constraints, which allowed Russian forces to seize and maintain the theater-wide initiative and conduct consistent offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine that achieved gradual tactical gains.[6] Putin's June 7 comments support ISW's previous assessment that Putin's assessment of Ukrainian capabilities and how Putin's perceived limits to Western support would incentivize Putin to pursue creeping offensive operations indefinitely if more rapid operations that lead to rapid decisive results seem unattainable.[7]

Putin's theory of victory rests on Russia's ability to outlast and overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of its economy and population for the war effort, indicating that Putin likely assesses that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm on Ukrainian forces. Putin's apparent assessment that Russia can "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out of all the lands it desires to occupy assumes that Ukraine will not acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel required to prevent indefinite Russian attempts to gradually advance along the front or needed to contest the initiative and conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian forces have previously shown that when they are well provisioned, they can prevent Russian forces from making even marginal tactical gains, force Russian offensive operations to culminate, and launch counteroffensive operations that liberate operationally significant territory.[8] Russian forces are currently leveraging the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine to dictate a tempo of fighting that generates casualties roughly equal to or slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces, which has allowed Russian forces to sustain their overall offensive tempo in Ukraine.[9] Russia is also further mobilizing its defense industrial base (DIB) and is generally far ahead of Ukraine and the West in this regard.[10] Putin and the Russian military command likely assess that Russian numerical manpower and materiel advantages will allow Russia to sustain this force generation replacement rate and field the required materiel needed to sustain indefinite creeping advances.

This strategy largely relies on Russia's ability to retain the theater-wide initiative, which Ukrainian forces can contest if Ukraine addresses its ongoing manpower challenges and receives sufficient, timely, and consistent Western security assistance.[11] Western security assistance pledges and Ukrainian force generation efforts will eventually allow Ukraine to accumulate the forces and materiel it needs to contest the initiative if ongoing Russian offensive operations are not successful in forcing Ukraine to divert manpower and materiel to defensive operations.[12]

Russian efforts to prevent Ukraine from accumulating the personnel and resources Ukraine needs to contest the initiative therefore are a part of an attritional war approach, in which the Russian military command believes that ongoing Russian offensive operations will inflict relatively more significant losses on Ukrainian forces and force Ukraine to divert manpower and materiel to stabilize the front instead of preparing for future counteroffensive efforts. This approach also requires that Russian forces avoid suffering outsized losses that would prevent Russia from sustaining offensive operations. There are limits to Russian force generation, as Putin himself admits with his continued aversion to another partial mobilization wave, and Russia's ability to expand its DIB has extensively relied on the refurbishment of extensive Soviet-era stocks, which are a finite resource.[13] Putin and the Russian military command likely calculate that these limits will not begin constraining Russia's ability to sustain its offensive tempo in Ukraine in the near-to-medium term, however. This approach requires that Ukraine is not able to inflict losses on Russian forces that decrease this offensive tempo or force Russian

offensive efforts to culminate. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine should contest the initiative as soon as possible because Russian forces are reaping a variety of benefits from holding the initiative, including their ability to pursue a strategy of attritional warfare.[14]

Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so. Putin notably did not identify what specific goals he assesses gradual tactical Russian gains will achieve, although the Russian military command has likely previously believed that such gains would encourage Western debates about continued support for Ukraine and cause weakened Western support that exacerbates Ukrainian materiel constraints.[15] Putin also did not specify which territory "should" be under Russian control, part of continued Kremlin rhetoric that purposefully leaves open room for further territorial conquest in Ukraine.[16] The current rate of Russian advance suggests that Russian forces may pursue individual operationally significant objectives over the course of many months if not years, and efforts to not bound the Kremlin's territorial objectives likely intend to justify indefinite creeping offensive operations as long as it takes to achieve Western and Ukrainian capitulation.[17] Putin may believe that as long as Russia can prevent Ukraine from contesting the initiative he can lock in limited territorial conquests while encouraging Western debates about continued aid to Ukraine once current pledges of security assistance are expended.

The end of Western security assistance would eventually lead to the collapse of the frontline and total Russian victory in Ukraine, a reality that recent months of delayed Western security assistance has further highlighted.[18] The West must proactively provide Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity that Ukrainian forces require for operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine and challenge Putin's belief that he can gradually subsume Ukraine should rapid total victory appear unreachable. The West also maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia's operational rear and deep rear areas in Russian territory.[19] The West must not surrender to Russia's strategic effort to destroy Western commitment to Ukrainian survival and must remember that Ukrainian victory has always been possible as long as the West remains committed to that goal.[20]

Putin indirectly indicated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a supposed Russian "red line" that would result in Russian nuclear escalation. Putin stated that Russia's nuclear doctrine calls for Russia to only use nuclear weapons in the event of "exceptional cases" of threats to Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[21] Putin stated that he does not think such an "exceptional" case has arisen so "there is no such need" for Russia to use nuclear weapons. Ukrainian forces have struck military targets in Belgorod Oblast with US-provided HIMARS systems using GMLRS since early June 2024.[22] Putin's June 7 statement is a significant rhetorical reversal given that Putin and other Kremlin officials have previously threatened Russian nuclear weapon use should Western states allow Ukraine to strike into Russian territory with Western-provided weapons.[23] Western and Ukrainian policies and actions have crossed Russia's supposed "red lines" several times throughout the war without drawing a significant Russian reaction, indicating that many of Russia's "red lines" are most likely information operations designed to push the West to self-deter.[24]

Putin heavily focused on proposals to solve Russia's labor shortage issues during his speech at SPIEF on June 7. Putin outlined a 10-point plan to grow the Russian economy and acknowledged that Russia is suffering from demographic challenges and labor shortages.[25] Putin called on the Russian government to enact multiple reforms to increase the labor supply and productivity, such as improving education and training, automating and digitalizing Russian industry, increasing the use of artificial intelligence (AI), and increasing spending on research and development. Putin highlighted the necessity of migrant labor to increase Russia's economic growth but stated that Russia has not yet developed a "meaningful" migration policy. Putin specified that Russia only needs skilled and educated migrant laborers with a knowledge of Russian language and culture and who will "not create any problems for local citizens in the workplace and in life." Putin ended his SPIEF appearance by stating that Russia "will treat the culture and traditions of [non-ethnically Russian] peoples of the Russian Federation" with respect as "unity is [Russia's] strength." Putin has touted Russia as a unified multiethnic and multinational state, but his June 7 statements demonstrate the differing policies and perceptions towards the indigenous, federally recognized peoples of Russia and migrants.[26] Putin's migration policy proposals demonstrate how the Kremlin continues to struggle to balance Russia's need for migrants to compensate for labor shortages and wide-scale anti-migrant sentiments in Russia, particularly as the Kremlin tries to further mobilize the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

Putin attempted to frame Russia's economic issues in a positive light, likely to prepare Russian citizens to make more personal sacrifices as Russia sustains a protracted war in Ukraine at the expense of Russian citizens' standards of living. Putin framed Russia's labor shortages as resulting from Russia's alleged "record low" unemployment, not a consequence of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[27] Putin stated that people who have reached retirement age have experience and knowledge that is useful to the Russian economy and that many pensioners have "aspirations" to continue working. Putin proposed that the Russian government annually increase pensions starting in February 2025 for pensioners who continue to work even after they reach retirement age. Putin met with St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov before his speech at SPIEF, during which Beglov presented the idea of increasing pensions as a direct request from working pensioners.[28] Large-scale protests erupted in Russia in 2018 when the Kremlin announced a raise in the retirement age, and Putin is likely trying to use monetary incentives to push pensioners to choose to work beyond the retirement age to help ease Russia's labor shortages.[29] Putin also highlighted the strength of Russia's DIB, claiming that Russia has increased its production of ammunition by more than 20 times in an unspecified time frame and that Russia has superior aviation and armored vehicle technology than the West.[30] Putin claimed that the Russian DIB has increased its production of civilian products by about five percent over the past two years, likely to justify Russia's increased defense spending and recent efforts to mobilize the DIB to civilians. Sberbank CEO Herman Gref, however, stated on June 7 at SPIEF that the alleged "unprecedented" growth of wages in Russia will last at most another year.[31]

Putin continued efforts to portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an illegitimate president and identified the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a legitimate actor with which the Kremlin can negotiate instead of Zelensky. Putin's recent statements are the latest in a series designed to obfuscate the legality of Zelensky's extended term by misrepresenting the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws.[32] Putin continued to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate actor who has "usurped" power in Ukraine as the Ukrainian Constitution does not allow for a Ukrainian president to extend his term beyond the five-

year fixed term.[33] Putin cherry-picked specific articles of the Ukrainian Constitution to make his argument, including articles he also recently grossly mischaracterized or took out of their legal context during a speech on May 28.[34] Putin claimed on June 7 that the Verkhovna Rada's power is extended under a period of martial law and that presidential powers should be "transferred to the speaker of the Rada" under articles 109, 110, and 111 of the Ukrainian Constitution now that Zelensky has "usurped" power.[35] Article 109 states that "the resignation of the President of Ukraine enters into force from the moment he or she personally announces the statement of resignation at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine." [36] Article 110 states that "the inability of the President of Ukraine to exercise his or her powers for reasons of health shall be determined at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and confirmed by a decision adopted by the majority of its constitutional composition." [37] Article 111 states that "the President of Ukraine may be removed from office by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the procedure of impeachment, in the event that he or she commits state treason or other crime." Putin is invoking these articles to suggest that Zelensky's extended term is "illegal" and that the Verkhovna Rada is the single authority to assume power should Zelensky resign, be impeached, or otherwise leave office before the natural end of his term. Putin also invoked Article 83, which states that in the event of martial law, the Verkhovna Rada's powers are extended, and Article 103, which states that a Ukrainian president's term is five years - again claiming that presidential terms cannot be extended under martial law while the Verkhovna Rada's term can be extended.[38]

Putin claimed that the Ukrainian Constitution does not mention extending the Ukrainian presidential term, but this statement ignores the Ukrainian legal framework about martial law. Article 19 of the Ukrainian law "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law" states that presidential and Verkhovna Rada elections are prohibited under martial law and forbids the Ukrainian president from abolishing martial law as long as there exists a "threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity." [39] Article 64 of the Ukrainian constitution states that "under conditions of war or a state of emergency, specific restrictions on rights and freedoms may be established with the indication of the period of validity of these restrictions" except for the rights and freedoms stipulated by certain articles, none of which are mentioned above.[40]

Putin's recent focus on legitimizing the Verkhovna Rada and its speaker in lieu of Zelensky highlights a target for Russian destabilization operations.[41] ISW has repeatedly assessed that recent Russian information operations aim to sow multiple divisions between the Ukrainian people, military, military leadership, and political leadership to undermine domestic and international support for Zelensky and Ukraine's decision to defend against the Russian invasion.[42] Ukrainian intelligence has identified a Russian information campaign called "Maidan-3" that specifically aims to spread doubt about Zelensky's legitimacy and has projected that these information operations will peak from late May to July 2024.[43] These information operations may intend to set informational conditions to eventually declare a Kremlin-backed actor as Ukrainian president, Verkhovna Rada speaker, or another title with whom the Kremlin claims it can "legally" negotiate with instead of Zelensky.[44] Two figures previously floated as possible replacements for Zelensky have since emerged in the wake of these information operations.[45] Former pro-Russia Ukrainian MP Viktor Medvedchuk recently participated in the information operation to discredit Zelensky.[46] Former pro-Russia Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich traveled to Minsk on May 24 for an unspecified reason, and Ukrainian intelligence described Yanukovich's last trip to Minsk in 2022 as a Kremlin effort to prepare Yanukovich for a "special operation" to be reinstated as president of Ukraine.[47]

Putin attempted to introduce his children and the children of other senior Russian officials to the public sphere at SPIEF, likely to set conditions for them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government. Independent Belarusian outlet *Vot Tak* reported that Putin's youngest daughter Katerina Tikhonova spoke virtually on a June 6 panel about the role of defense industrial organizations and discussed Russian technological development and import substitution.[48] *Vot Tak* also reported that Putin's eldest daughter Maria Vorontsova spoke on a panel about biotechnology on June 7.[49] *Vot Tak* reported that Tikhonova spoke at SPIEF in 2021 in a panel about BRICS and that Vorontsova has only previously attended SPIEF as a guest where she did two interviews on the sidelines.[50] Kremlin newswire *TASS* characterized Tikhonova as Innopraktika Company General Director and notably went out of its way to promote Vorontsova's professional titles and accolades by highlighting her position as Deputy Head of the Russian Faculty of Fundamental Medicine at Moscow State University and a member of the Russian Association for the Promotion of Science, and a Candidate of Medical Science (equivalent to a PhD of Medical Science).[51] *TASS* did not mention their familial connection to Putin. *TASS* is likely attempting to portray Tikhonova and Vorontsova as authoritative figures and to introduce them as trustworthy and knowledgeable individuals to the Russian public.

A Russian insider source claimed that the children of other senior Russian officials participated in SPIEF including: both sons of former Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head and current Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Director Mikhail Fradkov - First Deputy Administrator of the Presidential Administration Pavel Fradkov and CEO and Chairperson of Russian state-owned bank Promsvyazbank Pyotr Fradkov; Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov's daughter Yelizaveta Peskova; Presidential Aide Nikolai Patrushev's son Russian Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev; Presidential Administration Head Anton Vaino's son the Kremlin's Agency for Strategic Initiatives' youth work head Alexander Vaino; Russian oligarch Boris Rotenberg's son Vice President of Gazprombank Roman Rotenberg; Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko's son Alexander Kiriyenko; Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu's daughter Ksenia Shoigu; and Putin's first cousin once removed ("niece") and Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation Chairperson Anna Tsivileva.[52]

US National Security Council Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Pranay Vaddi stated that the US has prepared a new nuclear weapons policy specifically to deter Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran.[53] Vaddi stated at the 2024 Arms Control Association meeting that the US may have to deploy more strategic nuclear weapons in the coming years and that the US should be prepared if the US president makes such a decision.[54] Vaddi stated that the US remains committed to international arms control and non-proliferation values and agreements. Vaddi stated that Russia has repeatedly rejected talks with the US to negotiate a successor to the New START strategic arms limitation pact, which expires in 2026, and that the PRC has refused to discuss expanding its nuclear arsenal with the US.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a \$225 million security assistance package for Ukraine on June 7.[55] The package includes missiles for HAWK air defense systems; Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; ammunition for HIMARS; 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds; M113 armored personnel carriers; Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; and other materiel.[56]

French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6 that France will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers.[57] Macron stated that Ukrainian pilots will likely train between five and six months on Mirage-2000-5 aircraft in France and stated that Ukraine will have Mirage-2000-5 pilots by the end of 2024.[58]

The Russian Supreme Court declared an organization that does not exist as "extremist" on June 7, consistent with previous ISW assessments that Russia seeks to expand the legal definition of "extremism" to increasingly prosecute domestic anti-war sentiment. The Russian Supreme Court declared the "Anti-Russian Separatist Movement" and its "structural divisions" as extremist in accordance with a Russian Ministry of Justice request to this effect submitted on April 26.[59] Russian opposition media has noted that no such organization exists, and Russian authorities have previously designated other non-existent organizations meant to encompass broader "social movements" as "extremist." [60] Russian authorities likely intend to use this new extremist designation to further prosecute anti-war sentiment among Russians and within occupied Ukraine, particularly movements opposing Russia's occupation of Ukraine and movements within ethnic minority communities advocating for better treatment of Russian military personnel and mobilized personnel from these communities.[61]

The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger strategic effort that seeks to divide and distract Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik met on June 6 in St. Petersburg, and Dodik attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).[62] Dodik announced in a June 7 interview with Kremlin newswire TASS that Republika Srpska will adopt a Russia-style "foreign agents" bill, which would restrict the activities of non-profit organizations that receive foreign funding, that the government had previously withdrawn.[63] Dodik also stated Republika Srpska's intention to hold a referendum on its independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina at an unspecified date.[64] The Kremlin has previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to further influence the Balkans, sow divisions in the West, and undermine the Dayton Accords to throw the Balkans into turmoil.[65]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine on June 7 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.**
- **Putin's theory of victory rests on Russia's ability to outlast and overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of its economy and population for the war effort, indicating that Putin likely assesses that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm on Ukrainian forces.**
- **Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so.**

- **Putin indirectly indicated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a supposed Russian "red line" that would result in Russian nuclear escalation.**
- **Putin heavily focused on proposals to solve Russia's labor shortage issues during his speech at SPIEF on June 7.**
- **Putin attempted to frame Russia's economic issues in a positive light, likely to prepare Russian citizens to make more personal sacrifices as Russia sustains a protracted war in Ukraine at the expense of Russian citizens' standards of living.**
- **Putin continued efforts to portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an illegitimate president and identified the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a legitimate actor with which the Kremlin can negotiate instead of Zelensky. Putin's recent statements are the latest in a series designed to obfuscate the legality of Zelensky's extended term by misrepresenting the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws.**
- **Putin attempted to introduce his children and the children of other senior Russian officials to the public sphere at SPIEF, likely to set conditions for them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government.**
- **US National Security Council Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Pranay Vaddi stated that the US has prepared a new nuclear weapons policy specifically to deter Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran.**
- **The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a \$225 million security assistance package for Ukraine on June 7.**
- **French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6 that France will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers.**
- **The Russian Supreme Court declared an organization that does not exist as "extremist" on June 7, consistent with previous ISW assessments that Russia seeks to expand the legal definition of "extremism" to increasingly prosecute domestic anti-war sentiment.**
- **The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger strategic effort that seeks to divide and distract Europe.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, near Chasiv Yar, and northwest of Avdiivka.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 7, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City) as of 1400 local time on June 7.[66] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces in the Kharkiv direction are regrouping, likely meaning a tactical regrouping prior to resuming offensive operations.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional fighting continued near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) on June 7.[68] Geolocated footage published on June 7 shows Ukrainian forces operating in southwestern Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi) after Russian milbloggers previously claimed that Russian forces were in this area of the settlement, suggesting that Ukrainian forces conducted a local counterattack.[69] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Yuriy Povkh stated that 25 Russian personnel abandoned their positions in the Lyptsi direction and that Ukrainian forces have observed an unspecified element of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz operating as a blocking detachment in the area.[70] Povkh also stated that Ukrainian forces have not observed a Russian force accumulation in the Zolochiv (northwest of Kharkiv City) direction that would indicate that Russian forces will launch an imminent offensive operation in this direction.[71]

Fighting continued northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchansk on June 7, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Povkh and Russian milbloggers reported that fighting continued in central Vovchansk on June 6 and 7, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Tykhe (immediately east of Vovchansk) on June 7.[72]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 7, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Russian Field Fortifications
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Svatove amid continued Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on June 7. Geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Ivanivka (northwest of Svatove), although ISW has yet to observe confirmation that Russian forces have seized Ivanivka, as Russian milbloggers have claimed.[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further west of Ivanivka and along a front up to 2.2 kilometers wide and up to three kilometers deep north of the settlement, although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian minefields are slowing Russian advances in the Ivanivka area.[75] Geolocated footage published on June 4 indicates that Russian forces previously advanced near Orlyanka (northwest of Svatove), but Russian forces likely made these gains over Winter 2023-2024.[76] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; northwest of Svatove near Pishchane and Ivanivka; west of Svatove near Myasozharivka; and southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka and Hrekivka on June 6 and 7.[77] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Ukrainian forces repelled a roughly platoon-sized or greater Russian mechanized assault and destroyed four Russian BMP infantry fighting vehicles in the Kupyansk direction on June 6.[78] Kupyansk City Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevich stated on June 7 that Russian strikes are complicating Ukrainian logistics across the Oskil River, and footage posted on June 7 shows Russian forces striking a bridge over the Oskil near Kruhlyakivka (northwest of Svatove) on June 5.[79] Russian forces have routinely struck Ukraine-controlled crossings across the Oskil River in an effort to isolate the battlespace on the east bank of the Oskil River, although Ukrainian forces have not yet shown any signs of serious difficulties in supplying positions on the east bank of the Oskil River.[80]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kupyansk as of June 7, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



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- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine *
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: Russian sources claimed on June 7 that Russian forces advanced up to 2.2 kilometers wide and up to 1.06 kilometer deep north of Ivanivka. A Russian source claimed on June 7 that Russian forces advanced around 3.5 square kilometers north of Ivanivka.

Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly both made gains in the Kreminna area on June 7, but there were no confirmed changes to the front line. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), including elements of its 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment, advanced towards Terny (west of Kreminna).[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced southeast of Yampolivka (west of Kreminna) during partially successful counterattacks.[82] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Kreminna near Novosadove and Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske; southwest of Kreminna near Yampil; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on June 6 and 7.[83]

Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike on occupied Luhansk City on June 7, likely with ATACMS missiles. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces launched up to 12 ATACMS missiles equipped with cluster munitions at occupied Luhansk City and that Russian forces shot down most, but not all the missiles.[84] Geolocated footage published on June 7 shows smoke plumes and explosions within Luhansk City.[85] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor stated that Ukrainian forces targeted the Hosta Mohyla memorial area, where Russian forces reportedly have military barracks, and struck a Russian oil depot in the area.[86] Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik's Spokesperson Anna Romanova stated that Russian forces also shot down two Ukrainian drones west of Luhansk City on June 6.[87]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 7, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area as of June 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bilohorikva (northeast of Siversk) and Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk) on June 6.[88] A Russian milblogger claimed that the eastern part of Verkhokamyanske is a contested "gray zone." [89] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[90]


Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on June 7. Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[91] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in eastern Kanal Microraion, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[92] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka; near the Kanal and Novyi microraions (eastern Chasiv Yar); east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka on June 6 and 7.[93] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have utilized a large above-ground pipe to covertly move along the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal into the Kanal Microraion from the south.[94] A Ukrainian source posted footage of Ukrainian forces dropping explosives on the pipe from drones.[95] Elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) and 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar, and elements of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating within the Kanal Microraion.[96]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of June 7, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka amid continued offensive operations in the area on June 7. Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Novooleksandrivka and in central Sokil (both northwest of Avdiivka).[97] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced to the outskirts of Karlivka (west of Avdiivka) and Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka); north of Sokil; and near Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka) and Kalynove (north of Avdiivka).[98] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers from Umanske (west of Avdiivka) towards Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka).[99] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations north of


Avdiivka near Kalynove; northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Sokil, Novoselivka Persha, Novopokrovske, and Prohres; and west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka, Umanske, Nevelske, and Karlivka on June 6 and 7.[100] Elements of the Russian 24th Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka direction.[101]



Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 7, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced almost one kilometer south of Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[102] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka and Paraskoviivka.[103] Elements of the Russian 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[104]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on June 7, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced within Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[105] Positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka on June 6 and 7.[106]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 7, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- +— Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Note: A Russian source claimed on June 5 that Russian forces seized 40 percent of Paraskoviivka. A Russian source claimed on June 5 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer in Paraskoviivka.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 7 near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Kopani (northwest of Robotyne).[107] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novopokrovka (northeast of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[108] Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces previously advanced north of Zherybyanky (west of Robotyne), although Ukrainian forces likely did not make these gains in recent weeks.[109]




Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhia as of June 7, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Ukrainian forces maintain positions elsewhere in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast outside of their small limited tactical bridgehead near Krynky as of June 7. Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions north of Pishchanivka (northeast of Oleshky) on the west (right) bank of the Upper Konka River.[110] The Ukrainian General Staff recently noted on May 27 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Krynky and "other left-bank bridgeheads." [111] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are currently fighting Ukrainian forces in dacha areas near the Antonivsky roadway bridge (north of Oleshky).[112] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces operate on islands adjacent to Krynky and periodically enter the settlement in squad-sized groups.[113] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Pishchanivka, and elements of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division's 345th VDV Regiment are reportedly operating near the Oleshky Sands National Park.[114]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 7, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes targeting occupied Crimea and Rostov Oblast on the night of June 6 to 7. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces shot down 18 Ukrainian aerial drones flying in the direction of the Kerch Strait and Rostov Oblast.[115] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported on June 7 that sources in the Crimean

occupation emergency services stated that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged two Russian radar stations near Mysove (west of Kerch).[116]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 6 to 7. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched five Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from aircraft over Saratov Oblast and 53 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk and Yeysk in Krasnodar Krai, Kursk Oblast, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[117] Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces downed all five missiles and 48 drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts. The Kyiv Oblast Military Administration reported that a drone strike caused a fire at an industrial facility in Kyiv Oblast.[118] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synhubov stated that a Shahed drone struck Lyzohubivka, Kharkiv Oblast.[119] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces targeted critical energy infrastructure, and Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk stated that the Russian strikes did not damage any energy facilities.[120] Yevlash stated that Russian forces launched an unusually large number of Shahed drones for a combined strike and noted that Russian forces are constantly trying to maneuver drones around Ukrainian air defenses.[121]

Ukraine continues to adapt to energy constraints due to Russian strikes against energy infrastructure. Ukrainian state railway company Ukrzaliznytsia reported on June 7 that it is temporarily adjusting the schedule of some suburban electric train routes, limiting and discontinuing other routes, and reducing some routes' frequencies to reduce energy consumption.[122] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo announced on June 7 that Ukraine will start generating power with an additional reactor at an unspecified nuclear power plant to relieve Ukrainian power constraints for two weeks.[123]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

See topline text.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) has identified over 200 Russian and Belarusian officials involved in forcibly deporting Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia and Belarus.[124] The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration announced on June 4 that the GUR created a new page specifically dedicated to individuals involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children on the GUR's database of sponsors of and accomplices to Russia's war effort, including these officials.[125] Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova, who has also been directly implicated in the forced deportations of Ukrainian children to Russia, claimed in July 2023 that Russia "accepted" over 700,000 children from occupied Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.[126] Ukrainian First Lady Olena Zelenska stated on June 5, 2024, that Ukraine has currently verified the names of over 19,000 Ukrainian children that Russian authorities have forcibly deported to Russia.[127]

Russian officials are reportedly considering creating a new federal okrug (federal district) that would include occupied Ukraine. Russian Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky announced on June 6 that Russian officials are considering creating the "Novorossiia" Federal Okrug that would include occupied Crimea and occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[128] A Russian insider source claimed that Balitsky's announcement indicates that the Kremlin intends to focus on occupied Ukraine's economic development and integration into Russia.[129] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov clarified on June 7 that the Russian Presidential Administration is not discussing a new federal okrug but claimed that this discussion is ongoing among Russian politicians and experts.[130] It is unclear if the discussed new federal okrug consists of solely the Russian-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts or all territory within their administrative boundaries, including the areas Russian forces do not occupy. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in February 2024 that incorporates both the occupied and un-occupied territory of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts into the Southern Military District (SMD) (Crimea has been a part of the SMD since 2014), indicating that Russia maintains its objective of completely incorporating all five Ukrainian territories into Russia.[131]

Russian and occupation officials continue efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia. Russian state-owned bank Sberbank Head German Gref stated on June 4 that Sberbank plans to open 16 branches in occupied Ukraine by the end of July 2024.[132] Kremlin newswire *TASS* reported on June 5 that Sberbank is installing the first ATMs in occupied Donetsk City, Luhansk City, and Makiivka, Luhansk Oblast "in the coming days." [133] Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik stated on June 6 that he signed an agreement with the Russian public-state initiative "Russian Quality System" to expedite the integration of occupied Luhansk Oblast with Russia's common market and legal systems.[134] Russian Transport Minister Roman Starovoit claimed on June 5 that Russia is working to create a high-speed railway line connecting Russia with occupied Ukraine.[135] Starovoit claimed that a third high-speed railway in the south of Russia would reduce the travel time from Moscow City to Luhansk City from 20 hours to 12 hours.[136]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin voices continue efforts to undermine the legitimacy of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the upcoming Ukrainian peace conference in Switzerland. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matvienko, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin all reiterated standard Kremlin rhetoric claiming that Zelensky has been an illegitimate president since May 20, which would have been the expiration of his term had Ukraine held presidential elections in March 2024.[137] The Ukrainian Constitution explicitly allows an incumbent Ukrainian president to remain in office past his set term in times of martial law, and Ukraine's decision not to hold elections is in accord with the constitution.[138] Senior Kremlin officials have recently used this illegitimacy information operation to falsely portray Zelensky as unable to participate in meaningful negotiations with Russia, and Russian propagandist Vladimir Medinsky similarly disregarded the upcoming Ukrainian peace conference.[139]

Pro-Kremlin actors continued information operations aimed at discrediting the Ukrainian military and new Ukrainian mobilization law.[140] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned on June 7 that Russian special services are preparing an information campaign aimed at discrediting Ukrainian military leadership and special services, including through the distribution of "films" and other content in both Ukrainian and Western media.[141]

Russian milbloggers continued efforts to amplify information operations specifically targeting Western states, including Germany, France, and the US, that are part of a broader Russian reflexive control campaign to undermine Western support for Ukraine.[142]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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BABELSTREET

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